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January 22, 2007
Ms. Pat Bartholomew
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0210
Re: State v. Rhinehart, Case No. 20050635-SC
Utah R. App. P. 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites State v.
Norris, 2007 UT 5, in support of Point II, pages 19-30, of the State's brief.
Norris was
issued by this Court on January 19, 2007, after the State filed its brief. A copy of Norris is
attached for the Court's convenience.
The State also cites State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ^ 11-18, in support of
Point II.C, pages 30-31, of the State's brief. This court of appeals' decision was also issued
after the State filed its brief and is an appeal of this defendant from a related burglary
conviction. A copy of Rhinehart is also attached for the Court's convenience.
I would appreciate it you would distribute this letter and attachments to the Court.
The case is not yet set for oral argument.
Sincerely,

^ L A U R A B. DUPAIX
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Elizabeth Hunt, counsel for appellant/defendant
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Petitioner,

No. 20040880

v.
F I L E D
Richard F. Norris,
Defendant, Petitioner,
and Cross-Respondent.

J a n u a r y 1 9 , 2 0 07

Fourth District, Provo Dep't
The Honorable James R. Taylor
No. 981403794
Attorneys:

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., E. Neal Gunnarson,
Jeffrey S. Gray, Christine F. Soltis, Asst.
Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, Salt Lake City, for
defendant

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
^[l
The defendant, Richard Norris, challenges the
constitutionality of the Communications Fraud statute, Utah Code
section 76-10-1801, as overbroad. Specifically, he seeks review
of the decision of the court of appeals holding that the statute
is constitutional.
f2
The State cross-petitions, seeking reversal of the
decision of the court of appeals that an unconditional guilty
plea does not waive a defendant's appellate challenge to the
facial constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant
was charged.1

1

State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732.
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H3
Because we reverse, holding that an unconditional
guilty plea does waive a defendant's right to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute, we do not reach the other issues
presented.
f4
Review of the specific facts leading to the charges
against the defendant are not necessary for the resolution of
this matter. The defendant was originally charged with seven
counts of communications fraud. The State amended the
information, and the defendant was ultimately tried on five
counts of communications fraud.
f5
After three days of trial, the defendant elected to
change his plea and entered an unconditional guilty plea to three
counts of communications fraud. All are third degree felonies.
16
The defendant made no attempt to withdraw his
unconditional guilty plea. He did, however, timely file an
appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the convictions. We
granted certiorari to review the correctness of that action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
%1
On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals and not the decision of the trial court.2 "The
determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
is a question of law, which we review for correctness."3
ANALYSIS
^[8
In order to reach the issues of overbreadth and
vagueness, the court of appeals initially addressed the question
of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the
conviction on appeal once the defendant had entered an
unconditional guilty plea. The court of appeals4 found that a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
jurisdictional in nature and that, therefore, an unconditional

2

State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).

3

Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, H 8, 31 P.3d

1147.
4

Each of the court of appeals judges who sat on the panel
wrote his own separate opinion. The majority felt that a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute could not be
waived. The remaining judge felt that this could be waived and
that subject matter jurisdiction was therefore lacking.
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guilty plea could not act as a waiver or bar to raising this
claim for the first time on appeal. We disagree.
f9
An unconditional guilty plea waives any right the
defendant may have had to challenge the basis of his conviction
on its merits. The defendant's effort to describe the
constitutional challenge he raises as a challenge to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court is simply without merit
as a tool for appealing the conviction after the plea has been
entered and the sentence imposed. The court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The opinion of the court
of appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

flO Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins'
opinion.

3
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State v. RhinehartUtah App.,2006.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT
LAW
REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tamara RHINEHART, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20050553-CA.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313
(Utah 1998) ("It is well established that an
appellate court will decline to consider an
argument that a party has failed to
adequately brief."). Likewise, we do not
address Defendant's newly discovered
evidence argument because Defendant fails
to identify any newly discovered evidence
or discuss how it would have advanced her
defense at trial. See id.
BACKGROUND

FN2

Dec. 29,2006.
First District, Logan Department, 031101017; The
Honorable Gordon J. Low.
David M. Perry, Logan, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and
McHUGH.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
*1 H 1 Defendant Tamara Rhinehart was convicted
after a jury trial of burglary, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-202, see
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003), and theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-6-404. See id. § 76-6-202 (2003). She
appeals from the (1) denial of her motion to quash
bindover, (2) overruling of her objection to the
order of trials, and (3) overruling of her objection to
the use of hearsay evidence at trial. We affirm.FN1

FNL Defendant also raises claims
regarding a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence. We do not
address Defendant's claim that her motion
for new trial should have been granted
because it was inadequately briefed. See

FN2. "When reviewing a challenge to a
criminal conviction, 'we recite the facts
from the record ... in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.' " State v.
Lee, 2006 UT 5,<ff 2, 128 P .3d 1179
(omission in original) (quoting State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT I6,1f 2, 86 P.3d
742).
T| 2 Sometime after June 5, 2003, Defendant and
her boyfriend, Craig Nicholls, stole a safe belonging
to Defendant's aunt, Sue Davis. Davis kept the safe,
which contained approximately $6500, in her
apartment. To accomplish the theft, Defendant lured
Davis out of her home while Nicholls stole the safe.
During roughly the same time period, Defendant
told her hair dresser, Marne Christianson, that she
and Nicholls stole a safe containing $5000, that
Nicholls stole it from someone's house after
Defendant had lured the owner out of the home, and
that they dumped the safe in a parking lot after
cracking it open. Defendant also told Jessica
Goalen, a nanny who she employed, that she and
Nicholls stole a safe containing a large sum of
money, that the theft was "just like [the film] The
Italian Job" in that it was "really slick ... [i]n and
out," and that Defendant and Nicholls cracked the
safe open and then left it in a field.
\ 3 The facts surrounding the theft and burglary

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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came to light while Defendant and Nicholls were
being investigated for a related charge of murder.
Nicholls pleaded guilty to the murder in exchange
for a sentence of life without parole. The State
agreed to drop any remaining charges against
Nicholls, and he agreed to "fully cooperate with the
State in their prosecution of [his] co-defendant,
Tamara Rhinehart ... by truthfully disclosing all
aspects of [their] planning and carrying out" the
murder. During a subsequent police interview that
was primarily focused on the murder charge,
Nicholls briefly discussed his and Defendant's
participation in the burglary and theft. Nicholls told
police that he and Defendant devised a plan
whereby Defendant would take Davis out to eat,
and while they were gone, Nicholls would steal
Davis's safe.
\ 4 The police charged Defendant with burglary,
theft, and murder. At Defendant's preliminary
hearing on all of the charges, Nicholls invoked his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and was therefore unavailable to testify. The State
then presented into evidence the transcript of
Nicholls's police interview as evidence of
Defendant's role in the crimes charged. The State
also introduced a sworn statement from Davis and a
transcript
of a telephone interview
with
Christians on. There was no other evidence
introduced at the preliminary hearing to implicate
Defendant in the burglary and theft charges.
\ 5 Defendant was bound over on all charges and
subsequently requested severance of the charges for
trial. Defendant also moved to quash the bindover
on grounds that hearsay was wrongly admitted at
the preliminary hearing. The trial court agreed to
sever the burglary and theft charges from the
murder charge, but denied Defendant's motion to
quash. Defendant also moved to have the burglary
and theft trial held after the murder trial. However,
that motion was denied.
*2 \ 6 During the burglary and theft trial, defense
counsel asked the investigating officer, Detective
Bennett, on cross-examination whether he spoke to
anyone about the existence of the missing safe: "
You never determined that there is another person
on this planet that ever saw a safe in the possession
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

517

of Sue Davis, correct?" Detective Bennett
responded, "Correct." On re-direct examination, the
prosecutor asked several follow up questions:
Q. Did you talk to Craig Nicholls about a safe?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did he tell you anything that would lead you to
believe whether or not Sue Davis had a safe?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was that?
A. Well, at the time he described the area that he
had gone to to retrieve the safe.
Q. And what did he describe?
A. He described coming into the valley.... He
described the Sear's store which is located down by
Macey's at the south end of Logan.... He described
that he was to go into a home because there was an
aunt of Tam[a]ra Rhinehart who possessed a safe
with some money in that safe. That he would go
into that home to take that safe out while Tam[a]ra
Rhinehart took the family members to lunch or
dinner.

\ 7 Defense counsel objected to Detective
Bennett's response on grounds that it contained
hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection,
accepting the State's argument that defense counsel
had opened the door to the testimony. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Defendant
on both counts. Defendant subsequently moved for
a new trial. That motion was denied. Defendant now
appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
\ 8 Defendant claims that the trial court should
have granted her motion to quash the bindover
because hearsay evidence was improperly permitted
at the preliminary hearing. The determination of
whether to bind a defendant over for trial generally
involves a mixed question of law and fact, which
requires this court to afford some deference to the
trial court. See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,U 26,
137 P.3d 787. However, when a case presents only
a question of law, namely whether hearsay used at
the preliminary hearing was admissible under
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), or
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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reliable under rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, this court will review the bindover
determination for correctness giving no deference to
the trial court. See State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43,\
16 n. 7, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
\ 9 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred
in refusing to hold the murder trial before the
burglary and theft trial. We review a claim
regarding the administration of a trial court's docket
for abuse of discretion. See Walker Drug Co. v.
LaSal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) ("
Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
gives the trial court 'considerable discretion' to
administer the business of its docket and determine
how a trial should be conducted."); Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah
1997) ("A trial judge is given a great deal of
latitude in determining the most fair and efficient
manner to conduct court business.").
*3 U 10 Finally, Defendant argues that hearsay
evidence should not have been allowed at trial
because it was prejudicial and the trial court
incorrectly ruled that the "door had been opened." "
Our standard of review on the admissibility of
hearsay
evidence
is
complex,
since
the
determination of admissibility 'often contains a
number of rulings, each of which may require a
different standard of review.' " State v. Workman,
2005 UT 66,U 10, 122 P.3d 639 (quoting Norman
H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review,
12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999)). Legal questions
regarding
admissibility
are
reviewed
for
correctness, and questions of fact are reviewed for
clear error. See id. And, "[fjinally, we review the
district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of
discretion." Id.

ANALYSIS
I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover

K 11 Defendant argues that the trial court should
have granted her motion to quash the bindover
because the State presented inadmissible hearsay at
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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the preliminary hearing, and without the hearsay,
there would have been no evidence to support a
finding of probable cause. See State v. Virgin, 2006
UT 29,H 17, 137 P.3d 787 (holding that at a
preliminary hearing, the State must establish
probable cause with "evidence sufficient to support
a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the
charged crime"). Specifically, Defendant claims
that hearsay should not have been allowed at her
preliminary
hearing
because
Crawford
v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend. VI, XIV;
Article I Sections 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution
, see Utah Const, art. I, §§ 12-13; and "due process
rights both federal and state in origin" provide
criminal defendants with the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against them at
preliminary hearings. In the alternative, Defendant
argues that hearsay should not have been admitted
at her preliminary hearing because it was unreliable
and, therefore, inadmissible under Article I Section
12 of the state constitution or rule 1102 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12;
UtahR.Evid. 1102.

A. Whether Crawford Applies at Preliminary
Hearings
% 12 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him...." U.S. Const, amend. VI.
This provision, also known as the "Confrontation
Clause," was recently the focus of the United States
Supreme Court decision, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004). There, the Court held that
testimonial statements by witnesses absent at trial
may only be admitted if the declarant is unavailable
and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. See id. at 59, 68.
Although the Supreme Court in Crawford provided
an exhaustive discussion of the Confrontation
Clause, in contrast to Defendant's argument, it never
indicated that it applies at preliminary hearings. See
id. at 42-69.
*4 |

13 Moreover,

the Supreme

to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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previously explained that the Confrontation Clause
provides a trial right, not a pre-trial right. For
example, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39
(1987), a plurality of the Court stated that "the right
to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent
improper restrictions on the types of questions that
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination."
Id. at 52 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725
(1968)). And, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975), the Court explained that cross-examination
is "not essential for the probable cause
determination" that is the focus of the preliminary
hearing. Id. at 121; see also State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226, 1228 n. 4 (Utah 1995) (interpreting
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-22). Although
confrontation and cross-examination may enhance
the reliability of the probable cause determination,
the Supreme Court explained that "their value
would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of
constitutional principle, that these formalities and
safeguards designed for trial must also be employed
in making the Fourth Amendment determination of
probable cause." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
K 14 Although Utah has not specifically addressed
whether hearsay is admissible at preliminary
hearings post-Crawford, other jurisdictions have,
and they have reached the same conclusion that we
do today. See, eg., People v. Felder, 129 P.3d
1072, 1073 (Colo.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that
the right to confrontation is a trial right, and "
[n]othing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme
Court intended to alter" this conclusion); State v.
Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D.2006) ("
[The] Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is a
trial right, which does not apply to pretrial
suppression hearings."). The Confrontation Clause
pertains to a criminal defendant's right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against the
defendant at trial; it does not afford the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses at a
preliminary hearing, and Crawford does not alter
the Court's previous holdings with respect to this
matter. Consequently, we are not persuaded by
Defendant's argument that Crawford requires
application of the Confrontation Clause at
preliminary hearings.FN3

© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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FN3. Our conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which are constrained by the limits of the
Constitution,
see
Fed.R.Evid.
802,
expressly allow for the introduction of
hearsay at preliminary hearings. See id.
1101(d) ("The rules [of evidence] do not
apply [at] Preliminary Examinations in
Criminal Cases.").
B. Whether State law Provides the Right to
Confrontation at Preliminary Hearings
Tf 15 Defendant relies on State v. Anderson, 612
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that the
right to confrontation exists at preliminary hearings
under state law. In Anderson, the Utah Supreme
Court acknowledged the "critical character" of the
preliminary hearing and thus held that the
Confrontation Clause applies. See id. at 785-86.
However, this decision was expressly abrogated
first, by amendment to Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution,FN4 see Utah Const, art. I, § 12,
and subsequently, by rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.™5 See Utah R. Evid. 1102 advisory
committee's note ("To the extent that State v.
Anderson prohibited the use of hearsay at
preliminary examinations, that case has been
abrogated.").™6 Defendant argues that rule 1102
is invalid because Crawford supersedes the state's
evidence rules-and that under Crawford she is
entitled to cross-examine declarants at a preliminary
hearing. However, as previously discussed,
Crawford does not address preliminary hearings,
and therefore, does not invalidate rule 1102.

FN4. The 1994 amendment to Article I,
Section 12, effective July 1, 1995, added
the following language:
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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FN5. Rule 1102 provides that hearsay
evidence is admissible at the preliminary
hearing as long as that evidence is reliable.
See Utah R. Evid. 1102(a). The rule
further explains that hearsay is reliable if it
is "a statement of a declarant that is
written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim ..
. under oath or affirmation; or ... pursuant
to a notification to the declarant that a false
statement made therein is punishable." Id.
at 1102(b)(8).
FN6. The Supreme Court of Utah is
constitutionally empowered to "adopt rules
of procedure and evidence." Utah Const,
art. I, § 4; see also Utah Code Ann. §
78-24-4(1) (2002).
C. Whether the Testimony Introduced at the
Preliminary Hearing was Unreliable
*5 H 16 Defendant further argues that Nicholls's
testimony at the preliminary hearing, introduced via
the transcript of his plea interview, was unreliable
because even though it met the requirements of rule
1102(b)(8), it was offered by a coconspirator. In
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), the Supreme
Court explained that statements by accomplices that
implicate criminal defendants are inherently
unreliable. See id. at 131-34. In light of Lilly,
Defendant argues that "[r]ule 1102 is not and
cannot ... be read as a list of sufficient conditions
indicative of reliable] hearsay for the purposes of
preliminary
hearings."
However,
Lilly
is
inapplicable here.
If 17 Like Crawford, Lilly was concerned solely
with the right to confrontation at trial; it did not
address the admissibility of hearsay at the
preliminary hearing stage. See id . at 122-36. The
prosecution in Lilly attempted to introduce a
co-defendant's hearsay statements at trial without
providing an opportunity for the defendant to
cross-examine the declarant. See id. at 121.
Consequently, the Court analyzed whether the
statements at issue fell within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, and whether they satisfied the "
residual 'trustworthiness' test." Id. at 131-36. The
Court made no references to the admissibility of the
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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statements at the preliminary hearing stage, and
Defendant fails to provide an argument for why Lilly
should apply here. Therefore, we are not persuaded
by Defendant's arguments concerning Lilly.
% 18 Furthermore, the trial court determined that
the hearsay testimony admitted at the pretrial
hearing met the reliability criteria of rule 1102. See
Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(8). We agree with that ruling
because the statements were each "written, recorded
or transcribed verbatim." Id.

II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Refusing to
Reverse the Order of Trials
T| 19 Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by
proceeding with the burglary and theft trial before
the murder trial, arguing that she was unfairly
prejudiced. We disagree. Utah Code section
77-8a-l(4)(a) provides,
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in
an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial
together, the court shall order an election of
separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance
of defendants, or provide other relief as justice
requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4)(a) (2003). In the
event that a severance is granted, the statute does
not address the order of trials. To the contrary, our
supreme court has noted that a trial court has " '
considerable discretion' to administer the business
of its docket and determine how a trial should be
conducted.' " Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co.,
972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) (citation
omitted); see also Morton v. Continental Baking Co
., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997) ("A trial judge is
given a great deal of latitude in determining the
most fair and efficient manner to conduct court
business."). Consequently, when a trial court grants
a criminal defendant's request to sever charges, the
trial court retains considerable discretion to
determine the order of trials, and that decision will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
*6 K 20 However, the question of whether the trial
court abused its discretion in scheduling trials in a
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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particular order after severance is an issue of first
impression for our courts. The few jurisdictions
analyzing the same question have used a balancing
test to assess the competing interests of the State
and the criminal defendant. See, e.g., State v.
Walland, 555 So.2d 478, 481-82 (La.Ct.App.1989)
(balancing the defendant's right to present a defense
with the State's right to determine the order of
trials); State v. Nelson, 604 A.2d 999, 1001
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1992) (holding that when
two unrelated crimes are charged, evidence from
one trial could potentially be used in a subsequent
murder trial, and the defendant requests the murder
trial be tried first, "the court is required to perform
a balancing test and determine the prejudice to the
parties in interest by the requested delay"); State v.
Scovil,
387
A.2d
413,
416
(NJ.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1978) ("In ordering the
[docket after severance] there must inevitably be a
balancing of interests."); People v. Games, 510
N.Y.S.2d 409, 412 (N.Y.App.Div.1986) (holding
that even though prosecutor has broad discretion to
deteimine "prosecutorial priorities ... priority
should be given, among others, to cases where there
is a critical issue involving guilt or innocence, or
the possible loss of witnesses to the rosecution or
the defense"). But see Coe v. State, 298 S.W. 356,
356 (Ark.1927) ("Where defendants jointly indicted
sever, they stand in court as they would had they
been indicted separately. If one is not ready for
trial, or is not tried when his case is reached, the
next in order of succession stands for trial like all
other cases upon the criminal docket of the court.").
We believe that this balancing test is salutary, and
suggest that trial courts engage in this type of
inquiry when determining the order of trials after
severance.
^ 21 In this instance, although the trial court did
not explicitly engage in a balancing test, both
parties fully briefed their respective interests and
the court clearly considered those arguments.
Therefore, we can legitimately assume that the trial
court engaged in a process of balancing the parties'
interests. Moreover, we conclude that, after
balancing those interests, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the court to proceed with the burglary
and theft case prior to the murder case.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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Tf 22 First, Defendant argued that if the burglary
and theft case were tried first, her right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against her would
be limited because she would be unable to expose
the fact that the State's witness, Nicholls, had
received immunity in exchange for his testimony.
The State, however, responded that Nicholls was
given immunity solely for his cooperation in the
murder case, not with regard to the burglary and
theft case.
If 23 Second, Defendant argued that she would be
prejudiced by the order of trials because the jurors
in the burglary and theft case could potentially leam
of and be prejudiced by their knowledge of the
pending murder charge. However, Defendant filed a
motion in limine to suppress all statements related
to the murder charge, and although it is unclear
from the record whether the court granted that
motion, the murder charge was never mentioned
during the burglary and theft trial. Moreover, as the
State points out, Defendant's position was
inconsistent. On one hand, she wanted to refer to
the murder charge in an effort to impeach the State's
witnesses, and on the other hand, she wanted to
shield the jury from learning of the murder charge
so as not to inflame prejudice.
*7 ^| 24 Defendant next argued that if convicted of
the burglary and theft charges, the State could use
Defendant's
convictions
as
aggravating
circumstances in her murder trial. Although this
argument may have validity, it does not hinder
Defendant's right to a fair trial in the burglary and
theft case. See Walland, 555 So.2d at 480-81
(examining whether the order of trials would
prevent the defendant from presenting exculpatory
evidence in the first trial). The trial court had no
reason to assume that Defendant would in fact be
convicted of the crimes charged. And finally, the
State was prepared to proceed with the burglary and
theft case but was not then prepared to proceed with
the murder case, and urged the court to consider the
State's primary goal of expediting cases.
^1 25 After examining the arguments presented to
and considered by the trial court, we conclude that
it was within the trial court's discretion to proceed
with the burglary and theft case prior to the murder
[m to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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case. Our conclusion is further bolstered by the fact
that the trial court was in the best position to assess
the strength of the parties' arguments. See Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah
1997) ("The trial judge is in the best position to
evaluate the status of his cases, as well as the
attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties.");
see also Golsun v. United States, 592 A.2d 1054,
1058 (D.C.1991) ("We accord the trial court
substantial deference in exercising its discretion
because of the court's familiarity with the
proceedings, its observations of the witnesses and
lawyers, and its superior opportunity to get a feel
for the case.").

III. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Allowing
Hearsay Statements at Trial
K 26 Defendant argues that the trial court erred
when it allowed Detective Bennett to present
hearsay testimony at trial based on its conclusion
that Defendant had opened the door to the
testimony.™7 Although " 'it is proper to allow ...
any testimony which would tend to dispute, explain
or minimize the effect of evidence that has been
given by one's opponent,' " State v. Harper, 2006
UT App 178,U 18, 136 P.3d 1261 (quoting State v.
Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270, 274 (1972)
), the hearsay testimony at issue in this case went
beyond explaining Detective Bennett's responses to
defense counsel's questions, and was therefore
inadmissible.

FN7. Defendant further argues that
Detective
Bennett's
testimony
about
statements made by Nicholls
was
inadmissible in violation of Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
However, the Supreme Court made clear in
Crawford that there is no Confrontation
Clause violation when the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial. "
The Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of ... prior
testimonial statements.... The Clause does
not bar admission of a statement so long as
the declarant is present at trial to defend or
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explain it ." Id. at 59 n. 9 (citations
omitted). Because Nicholls testified at trial
and was available for cross-examination,
and did in fact testify regarding his
statements
to
Detective
Bennett,
Defendant's Crawford argument fails.
1f 27 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked
Detective Bennett if he had spoken to anyone about
the existence of the safe, to which he responded in
the negative. On re-direct, the State asked Detective
Bennett whether he had spoken to Nicholls about
the safe. Upon answering affirmatively, the State
asked Detective Bennett what Nicholls had said. At
this point, the State's questioning went beyond the
scope of cross-examination, and Detective Bennett's
remaining testimony constituted
inadmissible
hearsay. However, we determine that the admission
of Detective Bennett's testimony resulted in
harmless error.
*8 f 28 "Notwithstanding error by the trial court,
we will not reverse a conviction if we find that the
error was harmless." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86,
If 45, 55 P.3d 573. "An error is harmless when it is
'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of proceedings.' " State v. Loose, 2000
UT 11,U 10 n. 1, 994 P.2d 1237 (quoting State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). Here,
we
maintain
confidence
in
the
verdict
notwithstanding the improper admission of
Detective Bennett's testimony.
Tf 29 First, Davis testified about the existence of
the safe and its disappearance. Second, Christianson
testified that Defendant told her she had stolen a
safe, that it contained approximately $5000, and
that Defendant had lured the safe owner out of the
house so Nicholls could steal the safe. Third,
Goalen testified that Defendant told her that she had
come into some money in the same manner the
actors did in the film The Italian Job. Goalen
further testified that The Italian Job, which
Defendant and Goalen had seen together, was about
a group of thieves that stole a safe. Finally, Goalen
testified that Defendant said she had received some
money from Nicholls, and that she had to drive by
and pick up Nicholls after he stole a safe. Because
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this testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to
establish the existence of the stolen safe, the
admission of Detective Bennett's testimony was
harmless error.

CONCLUSION
% 30 We address three rulings challenged by
Defendant on appeal: denial of her motion to quash
bindover, overruling of her objection to the order of
trials, and overruling of her objection to the use of
hearsay evidence at trial.
Tf 31 First, regarding the bindover order, because
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), does
not apply at preliminary hearings, the State was
entitled to, and did in fact, introduce reliable
hearsay testimony in compliance with mle 1102 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Use of hearsay at
preliminary hearings is not prohibited by either the
United State Constitution's Confrontation Clause or
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Consequently, it was not error for the trial court to
deny Defendant's motion to quash bindover.
Second, the trial court has broad discretion to
determine the order of trials after granting a request
for severance, and in this instance, the trial court
did not abuse that discretion. And finally, we hold
that the trial court erred in admitting Detective
Bennett's hearsay evidence at trial; however, the
error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm
Defendant's convictions.
^ 32 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS and
CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Judges.
UtahApp.,2006.
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